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ABSTRACT 
 
Empirical examinations of the links between corporate governance and 
intellectual capital are under researched, particularly from the context of 
emerging economies where corporate governance mechanisms tend to be 
largely ceremonial due to family dominance. This study aims to address 
this gap in the intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) literature by 
undertaking an empirical examination of the relationship between 
corporate governance and the extent of ICD of Bangladeshi companies. 
Inter alia, the key findings of this study suggest that there is a non-linear 
relationship between family ownership and the extent of ICD. This 
research also found that foreign ownership, board independence, and the 
presence of audit committees are positively associated with the extent of 
ICD. Conversely, family duality (i.e., where the positions of CEO and 
chairperson are occupied by two individuals from the same family) is 
negatively associated with the extent of ICD. 
  
Keywords: Intellectual capital disclosure, corporate governance, family 
ownership, family duality, CEO duality, agency theory, Bangladesh 
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1. Introduction 
 
In today’s knowledge based economies, intellectual capital (in addition 
to financial and physical capital) plays a significant role in the value 
creation process of organizations. It is argued that the success of many 
21
st
 century organizations lies in their ability to unlock and exploit their 
intellectual capital to obtain maximum “organizational advantage” 
(Keenan & Aggestam, 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Keenan and 
Aggestam (2001) were among the earliest authors to identify conceptual 
links between corporate governance and intellectual capital. They argued 
that decision makers in charge of the corporate governance of an 
organization have a “fiduciary responsibility” to utilize the full 
advantage of intellectual capital, in addition to financial and physical 
capital. However, empirical knowledge in relation to the conceptual link 
between corporate governance and intellectual capital is limited. This 
study aims to contribute to the field of research on intellectual capital 
disclosure (ICD) (see for example, Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; 
Hidalgo, García-Meca, & Martínez, 2011; Li, Pike, & Haniffa, 2008) by 
examining the relationship between various corporate governance 
attributes and the extent of ICD.  
 
In one of the earliest empirical studies on European biotechnology, 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) found that board structure, independence 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality (i.e., when the same 
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individual is both the CEO and chairperson of the board) are related to 
ICD. Subsequently, in the United Kingdom, Li et al. (2008) confirmed 
these relationships with the exception of CEO duality. It appears that the 
study of Hidalgo et al. (2011) is the only empirical study that explored 
the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of ICD in 
a developing country (i.e., Mexico). They also introduced a new 
corporate governance attribute; that is, family ownership. Their findings 
suggested that family ownership does not influence the extent of ICD in 
Mexican companies. One possible reason for this result is that Hidalgo et 
al. (2011) did not test for a non-linear relationship between family 
ownership and the extent of ICD; however, this relationship can be 
established via a quadratic specification of family ownership (which was 
undertaken in this paper).  
 
This study was conducted in Bangladesh. Scarce empirical evidence 
exists in respect of the relationship between corporate governance 
attributes and the extent of ICD.
1
 Further, for the most part, previous 
Bangladesh studies have been descriptive in nature and used relatively 
small samples; for example, Ali, Khan, and Fatima (2008) found that 
ICD is mostly disclosed in a narrative form in annual reports and 
concluded that Bangladeshi companies do not have a positive approach 
to reporting ICD. Similarly, Khan and Khan (2010), Nurunnabi, Hossain 
and Hossain (2011) and Rashid (2013) found that Bangladeshi 
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companies provide limited ICD in annual reports, as it is not a 
mandatory requirement to report on this in Bangladesh. In a recent study 
in the pharmaceutical industry, Abhayawansa and Azim (2014) found 
that companies did not adopt a consistent framework for ICD and did not 
properly measure and manage their ICD.  
 
This research was conducted in Bangladesh, as it provided an interesting 
context for the study. The corporate context of Bangladesh is 
characterized by relatively small capital market, small firm size, and 
family dominated ownership structures. Like many other emerging 
economies, Bangladesh has adopted a western-style corporate 
governance model that requires greater board independence, separation 
of the CEO and chairperson, and audit committees. In 2006, the 
Bangladeshi Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a 
“Corporate Governance Notification” (SEC, 2006) that provides 
guidelines for corporate governance practices by listed companies on a 
“Comply or Explain basis.”2 However, given the traditional nature of its 
society (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008), and in circumstances where family 
ownership is the major form of business in Bangladesh, the efficacy of 
such corporate governance mechanisms could be compromised. Indeed, 
previous research (Sobhan & Werner, 2003) has reported that due to 
family dominance, corporate governance mechanisms tend to be largely 
ceremonial.
3
 Additionally, there are no legislative guidelines for ICD in 
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Bangladesh
4
. Thus, the influence of corporate governance dynamics on 
ICD may be different in developing countries such as Bangladesh 
(Rashid, 2013). 
 
This study can be distinguished from previous research and contributes 
to the literature in a number of ways. First, while exploring the 
relationship between corporate governance attributes and ICD it also 
tests the effect of family ownership on ICD (a relationship which has 
been understudied in the previous ICD research, but is significant in the 
context of Bangladesh). In this respect, the non-linear relationship 
between family ownership and ICD is examined. Second, this study is 
the first study in the ICD literature to consider the effect of family 
duality, which is very common in emerging economies, on ICD. Third, 
to date, the majority of studies have examined the effect of corporate 
governance attributes on ICD in a Western socio-political context; 
however, this study focuses on an emerging market, characterized by 
weak institutional framework and a high concentration of family 
ownership. Finally, the findings of this study increase understanding in 
relation to corporate governance attributes and ICD practices and extend 
the findings of previous descriptive Bangladeshi studies that mainly 
focused on the extent and content of ICD.  
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, a 
literature review is undertaken and hypotheses are developed. Section 3 
then explains the research design for this study, including details of the 
sample, measurement of the variables and the data analysis procedures. 
Next, the penultimate section of the paper presents the core empirical 
results of the analysis. Finally, the last section of the paper contains a 
summary of the results and offers some concluding thoughts.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
In this literature review section, previous research on the relationship 
between corporate governance and ICD is considered. This section aims 
to contribute to the stream of ICD literature that examines the 
relationship between corporate governance and ICD. Based on this 
discussion, six hypotheses were developed for testing. 
 
2.1 Family ownership 
It is argued that agency problems, characterized by a conflict of interest 
between owners and managers (hereafter referred to as “type I” agency 
problems) are less of an issue in family owned organizations (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2004). However, substantial agency problems may occur in 
family owned organizations attributable to conflict between controlling 
family owners and minority shareholders (hereafter referred to as “type 
II” agency problems) (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Given the absence of 
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type I problems in family owned organizations, family owners can 
mitigate agency problems. Concentrated ownership motivates family 
members to maximize the wealth of all shareholders and the 
opportunistic behavior of family members for personal gains is restricted 
by their long-term investment horizon, concern for their reputation and 
higher interest in the firm. Consequently, it appears more likely that 
family owned organizations would be concerned with information 
transparency. This, in turn, should result in a positive relationship 
between family ownership and the extent of ICD. Conversely, the 
presence of type II agency problems suggests that family owners may 
exacerbate this agency problem. Previous research on family businesses 
suggested that an increase in family ownership beyond a certain 
percentage could be detrimental for a firm, as the additional percentage 
of ownership leads to entrenchment and entrenched family owners tend 
to expropriate minority shareholders. Further, such concentrated 
ownership enables these family owners to dominate the firm and 
determine the strategies and policies for voluntary disclosures, including 
ICD. Caring less about information transparency may also result in less 
ICD. It is anticipated that this type of agency problem is very common in 
Bangladesh due to poor institutional and legal frameworks. Further, 
because the level of public interest in family owned firms is expected to 
be relatively low, these types of firms are likely to experience less 
pressure from minority shareholders in relation to the voluntary 
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provision of ICD. Accordingly, managers of family owned firms might 
not invest heavily in ICD because the costs of investing in these 
activities may far outweigh the potential benefits.  
 
It is posited that the combination of the effects of type I and type II 
agency problems will result in a non-linear relationship between family 
ownership and the extent of ICD. A quadratic specification of family 
ownership variable is used in this research. It is expected that any 
increase in family ownership (up to a certain percentage of ownership) 
will also result in an increase in the extent of voluntary ICD disclosure. 
It is also anticipated that at this ownership level there will be less type I 
problems, as any increase in share ownership is likely to align family 
interests with the interests of general shareholders. However, it is also 
predicted that beyond a certain percentage of ownership, any increase in 
family ownership will make the family members entrenched and type II 
problems may arise. At this ownership level, a negative relationship 
between family ownership and the extent of voluntary ICD disclosure is 
expected. This above reasoning led to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between family ownership and the 
extent of ICD up to a certain level of ownership which is followed by a 
negative association between family ownership and the extent of ICD.  
 
10 
 
2.2 Foreign ownership 
Previous studies have suggested that the percentage of foreign 
ownership influences the extent of voluntary disclosures (Al-Akra, 
Eddie, & Ali, 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Due to language barriers, 
lack of local contextual knowledge and the geographical separation 
between management and owners, foreign investors are likely to face a 
higher level of information asymmetry (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Thus, 
it is expected that foreign investors will demand more voluntary 
disclosures, including ICD. It is also expected that foreign investors in 
emerging markets, such as Bangladesh, will demand a higher extent of 
disclosures from companies, as these investors face more uncertainty 
and unfamiliarity than local investors (Al-Akra, et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, it is likely that foreign investors will influence the 
corporate disclosure practices, including ICD, of Bangladeshi 
companies. In the light of this discussion, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between foreign ownership and the 
extent of ICD. 
 
2.3 Board independence 
Board independence is defined as the proportion of independent 
directors to the total number of directors (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
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Independent directors are needed on boards to monitor and control the 
opportunistic behavior of executive directors (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Corporate governance mechanisms can be strengthened by the 
presence of independent directors on boards. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argued that independent directors also act as an internal governance 
mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between managers and owners by 
encouraging management to disclose more information. Other research 
has shown that a positive relationship exists between board 
independence and the extent of ICD (Li et al., 2008, Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti, 2007). However, a recent study by Hidalgo et al. (2011) 
found that there was no relationship between board independence and 
the extent of ICD. It is argued that in Bangladesh, purportedly 
“independent” directors are not truly independent and often fail to make 
disclosures. Sobhan and Werner (2003) noted that directors classed as 
being “independent” in Bangladesh were often former bureaucrats who 
had vested interests in the companies to which they had been appointed. 
This observation resonates with the findings of Uddin and Choudhury 
(2008) that independent directors are often appointed due to “personal 
connections”; rather than skills and expertise. Such appointments may 
affect the ability of directors in Bangladesh to operate independently. 
Thus, this research tests relationship between board independence and 
the extent of ICD with the following hypothesis: 
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H3: There is a positive association between proportion of independent 
directors on board and the extent of ICD. 
2.4 CEO duality 
As stated above, CEO duality refers to situations in which one individual 
is both the CEO and chairperson of a board. In these circumstances, 
managerial dominance is greatly enhanced, as such individuals are more 
aligned with management than shareholders. CEO duality may constrain 
board independence and reduce the ability of boards to execute their 
oversight and governance roles (Finkelstein & D’aveni, 1994). 
Additionally, CEO duality gives CEOs the power to negotiate with 
boards and may allow CEOs to pursue self-serving interests. Gul and 
Leung (2004) found that CEO duality resulted in lower voluntary 
disclosure, as in these circumstances boards were less effective at 
monitoring management and ensuring high levels of transparency. 
Similarly, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) found that a negative 
relationship existed between CEO duality and ICD. However, Li et al. 
(2008) and Hidalgo et al. (2011) did not find any significant relationship 
existed between CEO duality and the extent of ICD. SEC guidelines 
(2006) in Bangladesh require the positions of chairperson of the board 
and CEO to be separate. Given the regulatory context in Bangladesh, 
this study examines whether CEO duality has any impact on the extent 
of ICD. It is hypothesized that: 
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H4: There is a negative association between CEO duality and the extent 
of ICD. 
 
2.5 Family duality 
It is also possible that “family duality” may occur in family owned 
organizations. Family duality is defined as the situation in which two 
members of the one family occupy the positions of CEO and chairperson 
(i.e., the two most inﬂuential positions) on a board. An earlier study by 
Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, Mazzola, and Pozza (2011) contended that family 
duality ensures the alignment of the board’s interest with the interest of 
general shareholders. They also noted that income smoothing is less 
likely to occur when the CEO and the chairperson are the members of 
the same family.  
 
It is arguable that family duality may lead to situations in which top 
company management protects family interests over the interests of the 
general shareholders. In Bangladesh, family duality is very common and 
two close family members often hold the two top positions in an 
organization (e.g., a father as the chairperson and a son as the CEO). 
Indeed, Mazumder (2006) reported that barring multinational 
companies, the majority of listed companies in Bangladesh are 
dominated by family members, whereby the head of the family is the 
chairperson and other family members occupy important posts such as 
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CEO or managing director. Given the poor institutional and legal 
frameworks and the low level of public interest in family firms in 
Bangladesh, family duality may lead to management being less 
concerned about capital market and voluntary ICD. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 
H5: There is a negative association between family duality and the 
extent of ICD. 
 
2.6 Audit committees 
It is well established in the corporate governance literature that an audit 
committee is an effective corporate governance mechanism (Turley & 
Zaman, 2007). As an internal governance mechanism, an effective audit 
committee should improve internal control, act as a means of attenuating 
agency costs, and be a powerful monitoring device for improving ICD 
(Li et al., 2012). Notably, audit committees have been found to be 
associated with more reliable financial reporting, enhanced quality and 
increased disclosure (Ho & Shun Wong, 2001). Li, Mangena, and Pike 
(2012) and Li, et al. (2008) found a positive relationship existed between 
audit committee characteristics, including the size and frequency of 
meetings and the extent of ICD. Similarly, in the context of emerging 
economies, Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) reported that a positive 
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relationship exists between audit committee and financial reporting 
quality.  
 
The current legislative framework of Bangladesh, embodied in SEC 
(2012), requires at least two audit committee members be independent 
directors. It also requires the chair of audit committees to be a 
professional with accounting and financial expertise. Nonetheless, Khan 
et al. (2013) documented that more than 50 percent of Bangladeshi 
companies do not have audit committees. Given the prevailing family 
dominated corporate culture in Bangladesh, it is unlikely that audit 
committees would have significant influence on disclosure practices in 
Bangladesh, particular in relation to ICD. However, the presence of at 
least two independent directors on an audit committee could mitigate 
some of the influences of the presence of family members on a 
committee. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H6: There is a positive association between the presence of audit 
committees and the extent of ICD. 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Sample and data 
The sample consists of 135 non-financial companies
5 
listed on the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE). Due to missing information for corporate 
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governance attributes 19 firms have been excluded. The final sample 
comprises the remaining firms, with a total of 580 firm-year 
observations over a five-year period (2005–2009). Since there is no 
annual report database available in Bangladesh, 2005 was furthest year 
the authors could go back in the past. Furthermore, 2009 was the latest 
year of annual reports available when the research project began. The 
annual reports of the sample companies have been collected from 
various sources including DSE and company specific web sites. The data 
for corporate governance attributes, financial and intellectual capital 
were hand collected from the annual reports. The sample firms belong to 
a wide range of sectors such as cement, ceramics, engineering, food, 
jute, paper and printing, miscellaneous, pharmaceuticals, tannery, paper 
and printing and textile. 
 
3.2 Model specification 
 
This study uses a regression analysis technique to examine the 
relationship between the corporate governance variables and the extent 
of ICD. The regression equation is provided below:  
 
ICDIit =   α + β1 FOWNit + β2 FOWN
2
it + β3 FOROWNit +β4 BINDit  
 
+ β5 CEODUit + β6 FAMDUit + β7 AUDCOMit+ β8 FSIZEit + 
                                                           11 
β9 FAGEit + β10 LEVit+ β11 ROAit + ∑ β12 INDUSTRY DUMMIESi  
   5                                                       I=1 
   + ∑  β13 YEAR DUMMIESt + εit  
        I=I 
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Where  
ICDI = Intellectual capital disclosure score/ index 
FOWN = percentage of shares owned by the family 
members 
FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by the foreign 
investors 
BIND = proportion of indirect directors on the board 
CEODU = dummy variable equals 1 if same person 
holds the positions of CEO and chairperson 
in a firm 
FAMDU  = dummy variable equals 1 if 2 persons from 
the same family hold the positions of CEO 
and chairperson in a firm 
AUDCOM = dummy variable equals 1 if there is an audit 
committee in a firm 
FSIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
FAGE = natural log of the number of year since the 
firm’s inception 
LEV = ratio of book value of total debt and total 
assets 
ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
and total assets 
 
  
3.3 Dependent Variable- intellectual capital disclosure index (ICDI) 
 
The intellectual capital disclosure index (ICDI) represents the dependent 
variable in this study. Joseph and Taplin (2011) referred to this 
disclosure measurement approach as ‘disclosure occurrence’ that 
captures the breadth of disclosure as opposed to the depth of disclosure 
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captured via volumetric method. According to Nurhayati, Brown, and 
Tower (2006) ICDI is a more suitable measure for developing countries 
where disclosures tend to be low.   
 
To assess the extent of ICD in the annual reports, a checklist containing 
32 items has been constructed (see Appendix II). One of the limitations 
of prior ICD studies is that they do not provide the detailed explanation 
of the items and coding rules used to allocate information to intellectual 
capital categories (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). This study provides the 
details of the items in the checklists and coding rules used so that it can 
facilitate the interpretation of the findings. This study follows previous 
developing country studies (see for example, Abeysekera and Guthrie 
(2005), Abeysekera (2008a), Rashid (2013)) to develop a modified 
checklist including the items relevant to Bangladeshi companies. A 
dichotomous procedure is applied whereby a company is awarded 1 if an 
item included in the checklist is disclosed and 0 if it is not disclosed. 
Accordingly, intellectual capital disclosure index (ICDI) is derived by 
computing the ratio of actual scores awarded to the maximum score 
attainable (32) by that company.
6
 Consistent with Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) and Li, et al. (2008) the index is measured for each company as 
the ratio of the score obtained to the maximum possible score relevant 
for that company. 
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To examine the internal consistency of the disclosure index this study 
has used Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) which is 0.621 
and consistent with Botosan (1997) and  Gul and Leung (2004). Internal 
consistency refers to the degree to which the items in a test measure the 
same construct. Botosan (1997) and  Gul and Leung (2004) uses the 
coefficient alpha as a reliability statistics useful to assess the degree to 
which correlation among the information categories of the disclosure 
index is attenuated due to random error. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of 
this study provides a good support that the set of items in the disclosure 
scoring index capture the same underlying construct. 
 
3.4 Hypothesized and control variables 
 
The hypothesized corporate governance variables are family ownership 
(FOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), board independence (BIND), 
CEO duality (CEODU), family duality (FAMDU) and audit committee 
(AUDCOM). This study uses a quadratic specification of FOWN 
variable since a non-linear relation between family ownership and the 
extent of ICD is hypothesised. This study also includes a number of 
control variables that have been found in prior research to be related to 
ICD. The control variables included are firm size (FSIZE), firm age 
(FAGE), leverage (LEV) and return on assets (ROA). Larger firms are 
complex nexus and there could be conflict between the managers and 
shareholders (Inchausti, 1997), therefore increasing agency costs. In 
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order to mitigate these costs, these companies will disclose more 
voluntary information including information on intellectual capital. A 
more matured firm is concerned about its reputation and hence disclose 
more voluntary information. The companies with higher leverage have 
higher agency costs due to high risk surrounding them (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Thus creditors and other external parties demand more 
disclosures to reduce information asymmetry (Arvidsson, 2003). 
Profitable companies disclose more intellectual capital information 
(Ousama, Fatima, & Hafiz-Majdi, 2012). Finally, this study also uses 
year dummies and industry dummies for different sectors. 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
study. The average intellectual capital disclosure score (ICDI) is 0.155 
(median= 0.125). The average scores for internal capital disclosure 
(INTDCI), external capital disclosure (EXTCDI) and human capital 
disclosure (HUMCDI) are 0.137, 0.115 and 0.188 respectively. The 
average family ownership (FOWN) is 29.9 percent. The average board 
independence (BIND) is 7.10 percent and 24.70 percent of the CEOs of 
sample firms are also the chairperson of the board (CEODU). The 
average foreign ownership is 6.7 percent. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 2 presents the correlation matrix among different variables. This 
study also obtains variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables to 
test for multicollinearity. The reported variance inflation factors of the 
variables are less than 2 indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem 
for this study (Neter et al., 1996). 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The mean values of the explanatory variables included in this paper 
across the intellectual capital disclosure scores (for both firms with a 
score higher than the median and those with a score lower than the 
median) are reported in Table 3. T-test was carried out to examine the 
statistical significance of the mean differences in the explanatory 
variables between ICD score (ICDI) higher than the median and ICD 
score lower than the median of firms. It is observed that firms with an 
ICD score (ICDI) higher than the median have higher foreign ownership 
(FOROWN), board independence (BIND), presence of audit committee 
(AUDCOM). However, firms disclosing less ICD have higher family 
ownership and more CEO duality. Furthermore, the analysis shows that 
firm age (FAGE), leverage (LEV), firm size (FSIZE) and profitability 
(ROA) differ significantly between both groups. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 4 reports the results of regressing the explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable ICDI. In first six models this study tests the effect of 
individual hypothesized variables and in the last model all six variables 
have been tested. In model 1 this study explores the relation between 
family ownership (FOWN) and the extent of voluntary disclosure 
through ICD using a quadratic specification of FOWN variable. This 
study finds a positive and significant coefficient (β = 0.067, p < 0.05) of 
FOWN variable and a negative significant coefficient of FOWN
2
 (β = -
0.127, p < 0.05) variable. The signs of FOWN and FOWN
2
 imply a 
broadly non-linear relation between FOWN and the extent of ICD. Thus 
H1 is supported. This result further implies a positive relation between 
family ownership and the extent of ICD up to a certain percentage of 
ownership. This ownership level is estimated to be at 26.40 percent
7
. It 
is argued that beyond this percentage of ownership family owners get 
entrenched and managers are relatively less concerned about general 
shareholders and information transparency resulting in less ICD. It is 
notable that the finding with regards to family ownership contrasts the 
findings of Hidalgo et al. (2011) who fail to document any influences of 
family ownership on the extent of ICD in Mexico.  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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In model 2 the relationship between foreign ownership and the extent of 
ICD has been tested. This study finds a positive and significant 
coefficient (β = 0.163, p < 0.01) of FOROWN (foreign ownership) 
which implies that higher percentage of foreign ownership results in 
higher extent of ICD, thus supporting H2. This result suggests that 
foreign investors demand higher level of corporate ICD due to higher 
level of information asymmetry. This is consistent with the findings of 
previous Bangladeshi studies by Khan et al. (2013) who document that 
foreign ownership positively influences Bangladeshi firms to provide 
more voluntary disclosures through corporate social responsibilities. 
 
In model 3 the relationship between board independence (BIND) and the 
extent of ICD has been explored. This study documents a positive and 
significant coefficient (β = 0.286, p < 0.01) of board independence 
(BIND) variable suggesting that greater board independence ensures 
more ICD. This supports H3. Consistent with the findings of previous 
studies in developed countries (e.g. Li et al., 2008 in UK) this result 
indicates that independent directors in Bangladesh could act as an 
internal governance mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between 
managers and owners through encouraging management to disclose 
more intellectual capital information.  
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The relationship between CEO duality and the extent of ICD is tested in 
model 4. This study finds a negative but insignificant coefficient (β = - 
0.004, p > 0.10) of CEO duality (CEODU) variable.  In other words it 
implies that CEO duality does not influence the extent of ICD of sample 
companies. Thus it does not support H4. This result is consistent with 
Hidalgo, et al. (2011) and Li, et al. (2008). A possible reason for such a 
finding could be that a person who holds the positions of both 
Chairperson and CEO in Bangladesh is a family member, so it does not 
matter whether the two positions are separated.  
 
This study then explores the relationship between family duality and the 
extent of ICD in model 5 and finds a negative and significant coefficient 
(β = -0.014, p > 0.05) of family duality (FAMDU) variable. This result 
suggests that consistent with H5 when the positions of CEO and 
chairperson are occupied by two persons from the same family, firms 
provide lower extent of ICD. This finding also implies that when the 
positions in top management are dominated by the family members, 
firms tend to focus less on general public resulting in lower extent of 
voluntary disclosures. 
 
In the next model (model 6) this study examines the effect of presence of 
audit committee on the extent of ICD and finds a positive and significant 
coefficient (β = 0.044, p < 0.01) of audit committee (AUDCOM) 
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variable. It suggests that presence of audit committee results in higher 
level of ICD. This also supports H6. This result further implies that audit 
committees act as a powerful monitoring device for improving voluntary 
disclosures such as ICD. 
 
Finally, this study regresses all corporate governance variables on the 
extent of ICD in model 7 to test the effect of all the hypothesized 
variables in one model. The results with respect to the coefficients of 
hypothesized variables are consistent with main findings reported in 
models 1 to 6. In regards to control variables, the overall findings 
suggest that larger (FSIZE), older (LAGE) and better performing (ROA) 
firms are significantly related to greater extent of ICD. However, this 
study finds a negative and insignificant effect of leverage on the extent 
of ICD. The results with respect to the control variables are consistent 
with the previous studies (see for example, Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; 
Li, et al., 2008). 
 
As a part of robustness checks this study also examines the relation 
between corporate governance attributes and the extent of ICD for 
different categories of intellectual capital noted earlier in this paper. The 
results are reported in Table 5. In model 1 this study examines the 
relation between corporate governance attributes and the extent of 
internal capital (INTCDI) and finds a positive relation between FOWN 
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and the extent of INTCDI followed by a negative relation between these 
two variables. In other words, a non-linear relation between FOWN and 
the extent of INTCDI is found.  The findings from this analysis also 
suggest that foreign ownership (FOROWN), board independence 
(BIND) and presence of audit committee (AUDCOM) have positive 
effects and family duality (FAMDU) has a negative effect on the extent 
of internal capital disclosures. However, CEO duality (CEODU) has no 
significant effect. Firm size (FSIZE), firm age (FAGE) and profitability 
(ROA) are positively related to the disclosure of internal information 
while leverage (LEV) is not significantly related.  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
In model 2 this study explores the said relation for the extent of external 
capital (EXTCDI) and documents a non-linear relation between FOWN 
and the extent of EXTCDI. This study also finds that external 
information on intellectual capital disclosure is positively related to 
board independence (BIND), presence of audit committee (AUDCOM) 
and foreign ownership (FOROWN). However, a negative and significant 
coefficient for family duality (FAMDU) is documented. Among the 
control variables firm size (FSIZE), firm age (FAGE) and profitability 
(ROA) are positive and significantly related to the extent of external 
information.  
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Finally, in model 3 this study finds a significant non-linear relation 
between FOWN and the extent of disclosure on human capital 
(HUMCDI). In particular, this study documents a positive (negative) 
significant and coefficient of FOWN (FOWN
2
). This study also 
documents that board independence (BIND) and the presence of audit 
committee (AUDCOM) are positively linked with the extent of 
HUMCDI. The findings of this analysis also suggest a negative effect of 
family duality (FAMDU). However, FOROWN and CEODU are 
insignificantly related to human capital disclosure. For the control 
variables this study finds that firm size (FSIZE), firm age (FAGE) and 
profitability (ROA) have positive influences on human capital 
disclosure. 
                                            
Furthermore, this study undertakes a series of robustness checks of the 
results. First, an OLS regression test was conducted by using the natural 
logarithm value of the ICD scores as the dependent variable. This study 
reruns all the models (1 to 7) and finds that overall results do not differ 
qualitatively from those contained in Table 4. Second, an OLS 
regression test was also conducted by dropping all control variables from 
the model. The results are consistent with the findings reported in Table 
4. Finally, this study partitions the sample into two different sub-samples 
based on time periods – from 2005 to 2006 and from 2007 to 2009 and 
replicated the original analysis. The purpose of partitioning the sample is 
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to test any impact of the ‘corporate governance notification 2006’ that 
took place during the study period. The results for the sub-sample 
periods are qualitatively similar to the results in respect of the whole 
sample.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
This study investigated the relationship between different corporate 
governance attributes and ICD in Bangladesh. It noted that the majority 
of business enterprises in Bangladesh are family owned organizations 
and that strong family presences on boards of directors has resulted in 
the emergence of a culture in which the values of corporate governance 
mechanisms are not always properly appreciated by management (Al 
Farooque, Van Zijl, Dunstan, & Karim, 2007). Similar to many other 
developing countries, Bangladesh has adopted a rational corporate 
governance model; however, the traditional structure of its corporate 
sector is likely to impact on the effectiveness of such mechanisms. In 
these circumstances, it is expected that the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the extent of ICD in Bangladesh will be 
different to those in developed economy settings. 
 
The results of this study suggests that a significant non-linear 
relationship exists between family ownership and the extent of ICD and 
implies that as the percentage of family ownership increases, families 
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become more entrenched and ICD is adversely affected. This result is 
consistent with previous studies on family ownership (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2004). Notably, in the Mexican context, Hidalgo et al. (2011) 
found that no significant relationship exists between family ownership 
and ICD. However, unlike the majority of family owned organization 
studies (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Wang, 2006), Hidalgo et al. (2011) did 
not examine the non-linear specification of family ownership and, thus, 
failed to capture the alignment and entrenchment effects that relate to 
agency problems in family owned companies. By examining the 
neglected dimension, this study contributes to the stream of literature 
that examines the relationship between corporate governance and the 
extent of ICD. 
 
This study also found that a positive and significant relationship exists 
between foreign ownership and the extent of ICD. The positive effect of 
foreign ownership implies that foreign investors demand higher ICD due 
to higher information asymmetry (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). It was also 
found that corporate governance attributes, such as board independence 
and the presence of an audit committee, have significant and positive 
effects on the extent of ICD. Thus, it appears that despite traditional 
settings, corporate governance mechanisms involving presence of 
outsiders and audit committee have significant influences on the extent 
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of ICD made by Bangladeshi companies (Khan, Muttakin, & Siddiqui, 
2013).  
 
Additionally, the results of this study suggest that family duality has a 
negative and significant effect on the extent of ICD. However, no 
significant association between CEO duality and the extent of ICD was 
found. This result is similar to the findings of Li et al. (2008) and 
Hidalgo et al. (2011). It should be noted that in Bangladesh, CEO duality 
may have little impact, as these two roles tend to be occupied by 
individuals from the same family. To operationalize the CEO duality 
variable in Bangladesh, this study introduced the variable of family 
duality to the ICD literature and found that it is negatively related to the 
extent of ICD. 
 
The overall findings of the study provide empirical evidence that 
suggests that corporate governance attributes are important determinants 
of the extent of ICD in developing countries, such as Bangladesh. Thus, 
in line with previous studies (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Hidalgo, et 
al., 2011; Li, et al., 2008), empirical confirmation of the conceptual links 
between corporate governance and intellectual capital, as suggested by 
Keenan and Aggestam (2001), was provided. The literature was also 
extended by the introduction of the under researched family ownership 
dimension and the new variable of family duality, which has not 
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previously been considered in ICD research. The results of this study are 
based on Bangladesh; however, the regulators and policy makers of 
countries whose corporate ownership and regulatory structures are 
similar to Bangladesh may also benefit from the findings of this study.  
 
This study, like all studies, has a number of limitations. First, it focused 
on corporate annual reports and did not consider information from other 
forms of media, such as websites and independent sustainability reports. 
However, it should be noted that only a limited number of Bangladeshi 
companies have websites and independent sustainability reporting is a 
rare phenomenon in Bangladesh. Second, due to the anticipated problem 
of a lack of information in collected data sources, this study could only 
examine a limited number of factors and other factors may exist that 
influence ICD practices. Third, due to unavailability of some data, this 
study was unable to directly assess the effectiveness of directors’ 
independence in Bangladesh. However, this an area beyond the scope of 
current study and future researchers can explore this phenomenon, which 
may not be limited to Bangladesh. 
 
The findings of this study also give rise to some specific policy 
implications. The overall findings suggest that in the absence of 
mandatory disclosure in Bangladesh, internal corporate governance 
mechanisms could have positive effects on the extent of ICD; that is, 
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effective governance mechanisms could reduce information asymmetry 
through enhanced ICD. Capital market authorities, such as Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Bangladesh (SECB), may also wish to 
consider this. Improved ICD practices could also help increase the 
awareness of intellectual capital in Bangladesh and bodies, such as 
Intellectual Property Association of Bangladesh, may benefit from this 
observation. Further, the documented non-linear relationship between 
family ownership and the extent of ICD implies that SECB could 
implement regulatory measures, such as limiting family ownership to a 
certain percentage (e.g., 26.4 percent as in this study), to ensure that 
family owners do not become entrenched. 
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NOTES 
 
 
1. Appendix 1 summarizes the features of previous ICD studies in 
Bangladesh. 
2. This mechanism provides both flexibility in the application of the 
“Corporate Governance Notification” and a means by which compliance 
will be assessed. Any non-compliance or non-application of a relevant 
rule could still be said to be consistent with the spirit of the notification. 
Non-compliances/non-applications are to be monitored by shareholders. 
3. Due to institutional pressures, mainly exerted by external aid agencies, 
Bangladesh has adopted the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance. The effectiveness of such corporate governance 
mechanisms in the context of developing countries has been questioned. 
4. Some countries have regulations for ICD; for example, Danish 
guidelines exist for intellectual capital measurement and reporting, there 
is also the European project for Measuring Intangibles to Understand 
and Improve Innovation Management (MERITUM) and the Australian 
guiding principles on extended performance measurement.  
5. We have excluded financial companies since they are controlled by 
different regulations (such as Banking companies Act, Insurance 
Companies Act etc.) and are likely to have different disclosure 
requirements and governance structure. 
34 
 
6.  Two coders in the authors’ team have carried out the scoring manually. 
It has been done independently. Two coders’ scores have been 
reconciled to improve reliability and accuracy. The level of agreement 
between the two coders has been over 80% which is considered reliable 
in content analysis studies (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2006). 
7. β1/2β2  Where β1= coefficient of β1, β2 = coefficient of β2 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. First Quartile Third quartile 
FOWN 0.299 0.342 0.221 0.067 0.497 
FOROWN 0.067 0.000 0.188 0.000 0.001 
BIND 0.071 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.143 
CEODU 0.247 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.000 
FAMDU 0.419 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
AUDCOM 0.579 1.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 
FSIZE 8.700 8.705 0.661 8.346 9.041 
FAGE 23.659 24.000 10.705 14.000 30.000 
LEV 0.776 0.626 0.807 0.448 0.801 
ROA 0.075 0.071 0.095 0.035 0.114 
ICDI 0.155 0.125 0.103 0.086 0.219 
INTCDI 0.137 0.143 0.141 0.000 0.143 
EXTCDI 0.115 0.10 0.140 0.000 0.200 
HUMCDI 0.188 0.20 0.107 0.133 0.267 
 
FOWN = percentage of shares owned by the family owners; FOROWN = percentage of shares 
owned by the foreign investors; BIND = proportion of indirect directors on the board; CEODU = 
dummy variable equals 1 if same person holds the positions of CEO and chairperson in a firm; 
FAMDU = dummy variable equals 1 if two persons hold the positions of CEO and chairperson 
from the same family; AUDCOM= dummy variable equals 1 if there is an audit committee and 
otherwise 0; FSIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; FAGE = natural log of the number of year 
since the firm’s inception;  LEV= ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; ROA = ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; ICDI = Intellectual capital disclosure score/ 
index; INTCDI = Internal capital disclosure score/ index; EXTCDI= External capital disclosure 
score/ index; HUMCDI= Human capital disclosure score/ index. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
Variables FOWN FOROWN BIND CEODU FAMDU AUDCCOM FSIZE FAGE LEV ROA VIF 
FOWN 1.000    
 
     1.147 
FOROWN -0.379*** 1.000   
 
     1.607 
BIND -0.057 0.264*** 1.000  
 
     1.869 
CEODU 0.152*** -0.075* -0.136*** 1.000 
 
     1.057 
FAMDU 0.584*** -0.242*** 0.071 -0.478     1.000      1.913 
AUDCCOM 0.009 0.167*** 0.674*** -0.153*** 0.112*** 1.000     1.782 
FSIZE -0.374*** 0.330*** 0.129*** -0.030 -0.123** 0.238*** 1.000    1.296 
FAGE -0.234*** 0.123 0.027 -0.053 -0.187*** -0.005 -0.057 1.000   1.210 
LEV -0.108** -0.107** -0.125*** -0.001 -0.124 -0.143** -0.148*** 0.300*** 1.000  1.417 
ROA 0.112** 0.296*** 0.186*** 0.030 0.031 0.227*** 0.156*** 0.042 -0.401*** 1.000 1.311 
 
FOWN = percentage of shares owned by the family owners; FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by 
the foreign investors; BIND = proportion of indirect directors on the board; CEODU = dummy variable 
equals 1 if same person holds the positions of CEO and chairperson in a firm; FAMDU = dummy variable 
equals 1 if two persons hold the positions of CEO and chairperson from the same family; AUDCOM= 
dummy variable equals 1 if there is an audit committee and otherwise 0; FISZE = natural logarithm of total 
assets; FAGE = natural log of the number of year since the firm’s inception;  LEV= ratio of book value of 
total debt and total assets; ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; VIF = 
Variance inflation factor 
*, **, *** = statistically significant at less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level. 
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Table 3. Differences in the value of the explanatory variables between 
firms with higher and lower ICDI 
 
 Variables ICDI > Median ICDI < Median P value 
FOWN 0.271 0.325         0.127 
FOROWN 0.12 0.02 0.000*** 
BIND 0.10 0.04 0.013** 
CEODU 0.19 0.30 0.000*** 
FAMDU 0.413 0.464 0.037*** 
AUDCOM 0.83 0.34 0.000*** 
FSIZE 8.99 8.42 0.000*** 
FAGE 24.56 22.78          0.046* 
LEV 0.627 0.81 0.000*** 
ROA 0.097 0.05 0.000*** 
 
FOWN = percentage of shares owned by the family owners; FOROWN = percentage of shares 
owned by the foreign investors; BIND = proportion of indirect directors on the board; CEODU 
= dummy variable equals 1 if same person holds the positions of CEO and chairperson in a 
firm; FAMDU = dummy variable equals 1 if two persons hold the positions of CEO and 
chairperson from the same family; AUDCOM= dummy variable equals 1 if there is an audit 
committee and otherwise 0; FISZE = natural logarithm of total assets; FAGE = natural log of 
the number of year since the firm’s inception; LEV= ratio of book value of total debt and total 
assets; ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; ICDI = Intellectual 
capital disclosure score/ index.  
*, **, *** = statistically significant at less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level. 
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Table 4. Relationship between corporate governance attributes and ICDI 
 
         Model 1 (H1) Model 2(H2) Model 3(H3) Model 4(H4) Model 5(H5) Model 6 (H6) 
 
Model 7 
  Coefficient P value   
  
Coefficient   P value       Coefficient P value       
    
Coefficient    P value       
  
Coefficient P value       Coefficient 
    P 
value     Coefficient 
    P 
value     
Intercept -0.321 0.000*** -0.419 0.000*** -0.544 0.000*** -0.549 0.000**** -0.539 0.000*** -0.520 0.000*** -0.416 0.000*** 
FOWN 0.067 0.018**                   0.208 0.000*** 
FOWN2 -0.127 0.039**           -0.342 0.000*** 
FOROWN     0.163 0.000***               0.117 0.000*** 
BIND         0.286 0.000***           0.197 0.000*** 
CEODU             -0.004 0.599       -0.019 0.354 
FAMDU         -0.014 0.035**   -0.026 0.014** 
AUDCOM                    0.044 0.000*** 0.045 0.000*** 
FSIZE 0.071 0.000*** 0.054 0.000*** 0.068 0.000*** 0.069 0.000*** 0.073 0.000*** 0.065 0.000*** 0.054 0.000*** 
FAGE 0.001 0.000*** 0.002 0.000*** 0.002 0.000*** 0.002 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.002 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 
LEV -0.006 0.175 -0.008 0.037** -0.005     0.173 -0.008  0.072* -0.007 0.106 -0.007     0.086* -0.004 0.212 
ROA 0.263 0.000*** 0.137 0.000*** 0.176 0.000*** 0.222 0.000*** 0.231 0.000*** 0.178 0.000*** 0.117 0.000*** 
Industry 
dummy           Yes            Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes            Yes             Yes  
Year dummy           Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.467   0.609   0.576   0.539   0.445  0.564   0.632  
F stat 19.447   57.151   50.000   43.085   42.957  47.616   53.972  
               
 
FOWN = percentage of shares owned by the family owners; FOWN
2 
= Square of FOWN variable; FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by the foreign investors; 
BIND = proportion of indirect directors on the board; CEODU = dummy variable equals 1 if same person holds the positions of CEO and chairperson in a firm; 
FAMDU = dummy variable equals 1 if two persons hold the positions of CEO and chairperson from the same family; AUDCOM= dummy variable equals 1 if there is 
an audit committee and otherwise 0; FISZE = natural logarithm of total assets; FAGE = natural log of the number of year since the firm’s inception; LEV= ratio of 
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book value of total debt and total assets; ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets. ICDI = Intellectual capital disclosure score/ index.  *, **, 
*** = statistically significant at less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level. 
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Table 5. Relationship between corporate governance attributes and 
different categories of intellectual capital  
 
 
Model 1(INTCDI) Model 2 (EXTCDI) Model 3 (HUMCDI) 
  Coefficient  
    P 
value Coefficient     P value Coefficient  
    P 
value 
Intercept -0.422 0.000*** -0.478 0.000*** -0.372 0.000*** 
FOWN 0.301 0.000*** 0.337 0.000*** 0.081 0.023** 
FOWN
2
 -0.475 0.000*** -0.469 0.000*** -0.195 0.029** 
FOROWN 0.063 0.044** 0.299 0.000*** 0.021 0.365 
BIND 0.184 0.018** 0.275 0.000*** 0.151 0.011** 
CEODU -0.021 0.203 -0.046 0.623 -0.001 0.891 
FAMDU -0.035 0.047** -0.014 0.001*** -0.029 0.027** 
AUDCOM 0.073 0.000*** 0.032 0.005** 0.039 0.001*** 
FSIZE 0.053 0.000*** 0.054 0.000*** 0.056 0.000*** 
FAGE 0.002 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 
LEV -0.014 0.122 -0.001 0.852 -0.006 0.275 
ROA 0.132 0.029** 0.108 0.055* 0.122 0.007*** 
Industry 
dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R
2
 0.398  0.542  0.399  
F-statistic 23.479  41.179  23.583  
       
 
FOWN = percentage of shares owned by the family owners; FOWN
2 
= Square of FOWN 
variable; FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by the foreign investors; BIND = 
proportion of indirect directors on the board; CEODU = dummy variable equals 1 if same 
person holds the positions of CEO and chairperson in a firm; FAMDU = dummy variable 
equals 1 if two persons hold the positions of CEO and chairperson from the same family; 
AUDCOM= dummy variable equals 1 if there is an audit committee and otherwise 0 ; FISZE 
= natural logarithm of total assets; FAGE = natural log of the number of year since the firm’s 
inception; LEV= ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; ROA = ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes and total assets; INTCDI = Internal capital disclosure score/ index; 
EXTCDI= External capital disclosure score/ index; HUMCDI= Human capital disclosure 
score/ index. *, **, *** = statistically significant at less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
The key features of prior ICD studies in Bangladesh 
 
Study        Sample Research Objective Findings 
Abhayawansa 
and Azim 
(2014) 
16 
pharmaceutical 
companies 
Extent of 
disclosure 
There is a lack of awareness among the 
pharmaceutical companies of the significance of 
IC in corporate value creation and a commitment 
to publicly communicating IC. These companies 
did not adopt a consistent framework for IC 
reporting and they did not   properly measure and 
manage their IC. 
 
Rashid 
(2013) 
136 non-
financial listed 
companies 
Extent of 
disclosure 
ICD practices are very limited and there is an 
increasing trend of such reporting over the years. 
Most notable disclosure attribute was the human 
capital reporting. 
 
Nurunnabi et 
al. (2011) 
90 non-
financial listed 
companies 
 
Relationship 
between extent 
of disclosures 
and various 
corporate 
characteristics. 
ICD is very limited. Furthermore, size and 
industry are important attributes to explain the IC 
disclosure (ICD). 
Khan and Ali 
(2010) 
20 selected 
listed banking 
companies 
Extent of 
disclosure 
The banking companies disclosed considerably 
more human resource items than other categories 
of IC items. Moreover, the reporting of IC is 
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narrative rather than numerical terms.  
 
Khan and 
Khan (2010) 
32 listed 
manufacturing 
and service  
companies 
Extent of 
disclosure 
Human capital (HC) reporting in the annual report 
is insufficient since some items such as employee 
incentives programmes, employee value, HC 
statistics (such as profitability per employee, sales 
per employee), employee skill and competence 
profiles, etc. were almost completely absent 
among the sample of firms. 
 
Ali et al. 
(2008) 
22 listed non-
financial 
companies 
Extent of 
disclosure 
Companies disclose lower extent of IC. Further, 
IC reporting is limited to qualitative form rather 
than in quantitative form. 
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Appendix II 
Intellectual capital disclosure checklist 
 
I. Internal capital category  
1. Intellectual properties It is a term that encompasses patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
trade secrets, licenses, commercial rights and other related fields. 
2. Management philosophy The way leaders in the firm think about and its employees i.e. the 
way a firm is managed. 
3. Corporate culture Specific reference to working culture. 
4. Processes Management or technical processes implemented 
5. Systems Information systems. 
6. Networking  The systems available in a firm that allows interaction of people via 
a broad array of communication media and devices. 
7. Financial relations Defined as a favourable relationships the firm has with investors, 
banks, and other financiers, financial rating, financial facilities 
available, and listings. 
 
II. External capital category 
 
1. Brand Description of brands owned/bought by the firm. 
2. Customer satisfaction and loyalty Reference to overall satisfaction of customers 
3. Quality standards Includes ISO accreditations, reference to quality initiatives. 
4. Company image/ reputation It refers to the perception of a firm by the stakeholders. 
5. Favourable contract Favourable contract signed. 
6. Business collaborations Reference to informal collaborations with business partners 
 which did not lead to formal agreements. 
7. Licensing agreements Any partnership or collaborative agreements with other firms 
8. Franchising agreements Any franchise agreements signed. 
9. Distribution channels Reference to supply chain management and distribution. 
10.Market share Any mention of product/division market share or competitive 
Position. 
 
III. Human capital category 
 
1. Number of employees Clear detail of total number of employees. 
2. Know-how Description of knowledge, know-how, expertise or skills of directors 
and other employees. 
3. Vocational qualifications Additional qualification held by employees and directors. 
4. Employee training Any mention of training programme. 
5. Employee education Education of directors as well as other employees. 
6. Work related knowledge It mainly relates to knowledge that employees have related to their  
current job description, including employees’ previous working  
experiences. 
7. Entrepreneurial spirit,    
    innovativeness 
It refers to employee engagement, empowerment, and creativity. 
8. Union activity Trade union relations. 
9. Employee thanked Thanks given to the employee. 
10. Employee involvement in the 
     community 
Company and employee involvement in community based activities 
11.Employee share and option scheme Employee share and option ownership plan 
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12.Employee benefits Employee benefits such as provident fund, gratuity and group  
Insurance. 
13 Profit sharing Employee profit sharing. 
14. Health and safety Employee occupational health and safety. 
15.Equity issues  Equity issues such as race, gender, disability and ethnic group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
